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Notes and Comments
On Tap, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island: Last Call For The
Commercial Speech Doctrine
I hope the Court ultimately will come to abandon Central
Hudson's analysis entirely in favor of one that affords full pro-
tection for truthful, noncoercive commercial speech about law-
ful activities.
The Honorable Harry A. Blackmun 1
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects perhaps the most fundamental human right upon which our
nation is built - freedom of speech.2 Full constitutional protection
is provided to core First Amendment areas, such as political, reli-
gious and scientific speech. 3 Commercial speech, 4 on the other
1. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 438 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, § 16.2,
at 986 (5th ed. 1995) (citing Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Arkansas State Highway
and Transp. Dept., 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1433 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (stating that
"[fireedom of speech long has been recognized as one of the preeminent rights in
this country, the touchstone of individual liberty")).
3. Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm,
42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 411, 437 (1992). Restrictions on core First Amendment
speech are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 477. Under this level of protection, the
government must demonstrate that the regulation represents a "compelling" inter-
est and is also the "least restrictive means" available. Id. at 477-78. Strict scru-
tiny analysis has varied. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)
(stating strict scrutiny analysis requires that "no alternative forms of regulation"
exist), with Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960 (1996) (rejecting the least restric-
tive means requirement as "impossibly stringent"). See infra note 108 and accom-
panying text.
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hand, has traditionally been allotted less protection.5 Over the
past half century, however, the United States Supreme Court has
issued a confusing array of decisions regarding the precise parame-
ters of the commercial speech doctrine. 6
In Valentine v. Chrestensen,v the Court ruled commercial
speech was not entitled to any constitutional protection.8 Thirty-
four years later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,s the Court altered its view, and
held that purely commercial speech was entitled to First Amend-
ment protection. 10 Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, 1
the Supreme Court re-examined Virginia Pharmacy, and decided
commercial speech could be regulated if the state satisfied a four-
prong test. 12 The Central Hudson test has subsequently been used
4. Commercial speech has been defined as speech which does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
5. Commercial speech restrictions are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980). Under this test, the government must assert a substantial interest
and the regulation must be in proportion to this interest. Id.
6. Courts have struggled to apply this doctrine. Compare Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)
(advertising commercial information, no matter how tasteless, is indispensable to
the public interest), with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (stating
that the Constitution imposes no restraints on government to restrict purely com-
mercial speech). Scholars have also disagreed as to the extent of protection that
should be afforded to commercial speech. Compare Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1990) (arguing full First
Amendment protection for commercial speech), with Robert H. Bork, Neutral Prin-
ciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) ("Constitu-
tional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political.").
7. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
8. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
9. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
10. Id. at 762. The Virginia Pharmacy Court noted that the pharmacist who
wished to communicate "pure commercial speech" did not attempt to editorialize
on a cultural, philosophical or political subject; but instead only wished to adver-
tise "X prescription drug at the Y price." Id. at 761.
11. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
12. See id. For commercial speech to come within Central Hudson's four-part
test it must "[1] concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next we ask [2]
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest." Id. at 566.
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to determine the constitutionality of all commercial speech
restrictions.
While the Court may have envisioned a uniform test to provide
a consistent analytical framework, the Central Hudson test has
proven to be nothing more than an inconsistently applied ad hoc
balancing test.' 3 During the past sixteen years, the Court has de-
cided at least seventeen commercial speech cases; 14 each case rep-
resenting an opportunity to further clarify the four-prong test.
13. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating the Central Hudson test has "nothing more than
policy intuition to support it."); id. at 1520 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Central
Hudson 'test' [is] as a general matter, very difficult to apply with any uniformity.").
14. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (restricting the price advertising of alcohol
unconstitutional); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (uphold-
ing thirty day moratorium on solicitation of accident victims); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (prohibiting beer labels from displaying alco-
hol content violates First Amendment); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. and Profl
Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994) (censuring attorney for referring to "CPA" and
"CFP" credentials unconstitutional); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.
418 (1993) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting radio broadcast of lottery ad-
vertisements by licensees located in a state that does not allow the lottery); Eden-
field v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (banning personal solicitation by certified public
accountants unconstitutional); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993) (ordering the removal of newsracks containing "commercial hand-
bills," while allowing similar newsracks containing "newspapers" unconstitu-
tional); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of IlL, 496 U.S. 91
(1990) (barring attorney from advertising as a trial specialist unconstitutional);
Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding
the fourth prong analysis does not require the absolute least restrictive means),
dismissed as moot by Fox v. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y., 764 F.
Supp. 747 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 42 F.3d. 135 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 2634 (1995); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (prohibiting
attorneys from sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients
known to be facing a particular problem abridges free speech); Posadas de P.R.
Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (advertising casino gambling
only to tourists constitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (barring attorney from placing truth-
ful and nonmisleading advertisements in the newspaper unconstitutional); Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (holding state law requiring cable
television systems operators to delete all alcohol advertisements appearing in out-
of-state signals retransmitted within state unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding statute prohibiting the mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives unconstitutional); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982) (restricting attorney advertising to specified language unconstitu-
tional); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (White, J., plu-
rality) (invalidating ordinance that permitted commercial billboards while
prohibiting noncommercial); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (holding regulation
completely banning promotional advertising by electrical utility unconstitutional).
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Instead of developing clear rules, however, the Court has wavered
from nearly extending full First Amendment protection to commer-
cial speech in 1976,15 to granting the state great deference in re-
stricting commercial speech in 1986,16 and back to establishing
strict rules that make it more difficult for states to restrict com-
mercial speech in 1993.17 The frequency with which the Court has
ruled on commercial speech cases, combined with the inconsistent
application of the Central Hudson test, has left the legal commu-
nity guessing the outcomes of future cases.' 8
Often, interested parties had no way to gauge their chances for
success until after a decision had been issued. 19 For sixteen years,
the Court has accepted the Central Hudson test and the confusion
it caused. But now, after years of inconsistently applying the test,
the Supreme Court is ready to return to the clear rule established
in Virginia Pharmacy: "all attempts to dissuade legal choices by
citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible."20
15. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (holding that the state may not completely sup-
press the dissemination of truthful information relating to a lawful activity). See
also Mary B. Nutt, Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech,
41 Vand. L. Rev. 173, 185 (1988) ("Virginia Board and its progeny represent the
peak of constitutional protection for commercial speech.").
16. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-42. See also infra note 64; 44 Liquormart,
116 S. Ct. at 1522 (O'Connor, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Souter & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring) (criticizing Posadas as accepting, "without further inquiry" the legisla-
ture's assertions that the regulations "furthered the government's interest and
were no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest").
17. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71 (stating the third prong cannot be satis-
fied by speculation or conjecture, but only if the government demonstrates that the
harms are real, and the restriction will alleviate these harms to a material degree);
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417 n.13 (stating that the existence of numerous
and obvious less burdensome alternatives is a relevant consideration in the fourth
prong analysis). But see Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 427 ("It is readily apparent
that [the third prong's analysis] cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to
[Edge Broadcasting alone] .... [but to the] general application to others . . ").
18. See Felix H. Kent, Re-affirmation of First Amendment in Commercial
Speech, N.Y. L.J., April 16, 1993, at 3 (stating the Supreme Court's protection of
commercial speech has been "a Supreme Court-made roller coaster ride").
19. See Dennis William Bishop, Note, Building the House on a Weak Founda-
tion: Edenflield v. Fane and the Current State of the Commercial Speech Doctrine,
22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1143, 1143 (1995) (stating a participant "could only wonder which
way the pendulum of commercial speech protection would swing on his day in
court").
20. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1520 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
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In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,21 the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that Rhode Island's ban on the
price advertising of alcoholic beverages violated the First Amend-
ment.22 Despite the unanimous holding, the Court once again
failed to establish the parameters of the commercial speech doc-
trine clearly. Instead, the Court issued four separate opinions -
none receiving a majority. 23 Three of the four opinions, however,
mark a dramatic shift in the commercial speech rationale. These
opinions explicitly and implicitly demonstrate the Justices' discon-
tent with the Central Hudson test and suggest the Court is ready
to abandon it.
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in 44 Li-
quormart and discusses its impact on the evolution of the commer-
cial speech doctrine. Part I traces the development of the doctrine
from its inception in Valentine v. Chrestensen in 1942, through the
end of the 1995 Term. Part II analyzes the four opinions in 44
Liquormart and elucidates how the Supreme Court has laid the
foundation for abandoning the Central Hudson test. Part III dis-
cusses the untenable distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech, and projects the future of the commercial speech
doctrine. In conclusion, this Note proposes that truthful, nonmis-
leading commercial speech relating to a lawful activity demands
the full protection of the First Amendment.24
21. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
22. Id.
23. Justice Stevens wrote the Court's principal opinion. Justices Scalia and
Thomas issued separate concurring opinions, while Justice O'Connor also wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter
and Justice Breyer signed.
24. While this Note proposes to extend full First Amendment protection to
truthful, nonmisleading information relating to a lawful activity, this Note does
not suggest that commercial information can never be restricted. For instance,
President William J. Clinton has recently instructed the Federal Drug Administra-
tion to restrict tobacco advertisements aimed at minors. Peter T. Kilborn, Clinton
Approves a Series of Curbs on Cigarette Ads, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al. In
accordance with the rules proposed in this Note, the new regulations would sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny because the regulated activity is not lawful. See, e.g.,
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-500 (Law Co-op. 1976) (selling cigarettes to minors is
illegal).
1996]
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances. 25
The Amendment seems to be clear and unambiguous. 26 No dis-
tinction is made between commercial and noncommercial speech.27
Additionally, no exception is provided for speech proposing com-
mercial transactions. 28 The plain language of the First Amend-
ment simply prohibits Congress from making any law abridging
the freedom of speech.29
Not only does the text of the First Amendment treat commer-
cial and noncommercial speech equally, but early America also did
not distinguish between the two types of speech. In fact, one of the
earliest arguments for the freedom of the press was in defense of a
commercial advertisement. 30 To many Colonial Americans, com-
25. U.S. Const. amend. I.
26. See Ahkil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 Roger
Wins. U. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1996) ("[Tthe First Amendment open[s] with words sug-
gesting an utter lack of enumerated power... to restrict speech .... ."); Hugo L.
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 874 (1960) ("The phrase 'Congress
shall make no law' is composed of plain words, easily understood.").
27. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 631.
28. Id.
29. Amar, supra note 26, at 6.
30. Brief for Amici Curiae of American Advertising Federation at 15-17, 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (No. 94-1140) (citing Ver-
ner W. Crane, Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press, 1758-1775 xvi (1950)). In
1731, Benjamin Franklin placed an advertisement in a newspaper seeking a ship's
captain for an upcoming voyage. Id. at 17. A portion of the advertisement enraged
the local clergy by stating "No Sea Hens [women of ill-repute] nor Black Gowns
[members of the local clergy] will be admitted on any Terms." Id. Defending his
decision to print the advertisement, Franklin published his "Apology for Printers."
Franklin stated, "Printers are educated in the Belief, that when Men differ in
Opinion, both Sides ought equally to have the Advantage of being heard by the
Publick...." Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers, Penn. Gazette, June 10,
1731, reprinted in Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of the Press From Zenger to Jeffer-
son 5 (1966). Franklin continued that, it was unreasonable "[t]hat Printers ought
not to print any Thing but what they approve;' since... an End would thereby be
put to Free Writing, and the World would afterwards have nothing to read but
what happen'd to be the Opinions of Printers." Id. at 6.
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mercial advertisements were as important as news reports.3 1 Ad-
vertisements were regarded as one of the most important parts of a
newspaper since they provided valuable information to the public
on commercial matters.32 Nevertheless, when Valentine reached
the Supreme Court in 1942, the Court, for the first time, distin-
guished commercial speech from noncommercial speech. This case
marked the beginning of the commercial speech exception to the
First Amendment.
Chrestensen, the owner of a former Navy submarine, distrib-
uted single-sided handbills advertising tours for a fee.3 3 He was
warned that distributing the handbills violated the Sanitary Code,
but that he could freely distribute handbills devoted to "informa-
tion or a public protest."34 Chrestensen promptly responded by
printing a two-sided handbill. 35 One side of the handbill contained
an advertisement for the submarine tour, while the opposite side
consisted entirely of a protest against the City Dock Department.3 6
The Supreme Court unanimously held Chrestensen's right to
distribute the handbills was not protected. 37 In a brief opinion,3
where no authority was cited, the Court merely concluded that "the
Constitution imposes no restraint on government as respects
31. Commercial advertisements were such an integral part of early America
that the American daily newspaper naturally evolved from the large demand for
advertising. In 1771, the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser began as a bi-
weekly newspaper. Frank Presbrey, The History and Development of Advertising
162 (1929). By September 21, 1784, the demand for advertising space became so
great the newspaper was transformed into a daily paper. Id. As its title indicates,
the daily newspaper was largely devoted to advertising. The entire front page of
the newspaper consisted of advertising, as were between ten and thirteen columns
of the sixteen column newspaper. Id. at 161.
32. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience 328 (1958).
As one prominent colonial printer-historian observed, "[advertisements] are well
calculated to enlarge and enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of being enu-
merated among the many methods of awakening and maintaining the popular at-
tention .... ." Isaiah Thomas, History of Printing in America with a Biography of
Printers, and an Account of Newspapers (1810) (quoted in Daniel J. Boorstin, The
Americans: The Colonial Experience 328 (1958)).
33. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942).
34. Id. (quoting the Police Commissioner's advice concerning the type of hand-
bills that may be distributed).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 55.
38. The entire opinion, including footnotes, comprises just over three pages in
the United States Reports. Id. at 52-55.
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purely commercial advertising."39 The Court never mentioned the
First Amendment, and referred to it only once to pose the question
whether the statute was an "unconstitutional abridgement of the
freedom of the press and of speech."40 In addition, the Court never
explained why commercial speech should receive less than full pro-
tection.4 1 Nonetheless, with this ruling, the commercial speech ex-
ception to the First Amendment was recognized.
Slowly, the exception enunciated in Valentine eroded. Justice
Douglas noted that the Valentine rule was "casual, almost off-
hand," and that the decision "ha[d] not survived reflection." 42
Throughout the early 1970s, the Supreme Court continued to chip
away at Valentine.43 Finally, in the mid 1970s, in Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia,44 the Supreme Court first recognized that commercialism
did not, in itself, prevent the First Amendment from being
applicable. 45
In Bigelow, the State of Virginia challenged the legality of an
advertisement placed in one of its newspapers for abortions being
performed in New York.46 The Supreme Court held the advertise-
39. Id. at 54. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 628.
40. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 628.
41. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 634.
42. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1958) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
43. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (doubting the validity of the distinction stated in Valentine). See
also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 393 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 397-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898,
905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating the Valentine
decision was "ill-conceived and has not weathered subsequent scrutiny").
44. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
45. Id. at 818.
46. The advertisement in the Virginia Weekly stated in part:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
Id. at 812.
Virginia challenged the placement of this advertisement under Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.1-63 which read "If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by
sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt
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ment was protected by the First Amendment since the speech was
not purely commercial and "did more than simply propose a com-
mercial transaction."47 Specifically, the Court noted the advertise-
ment contained "factual material of clear 'public interest.'" 48
While Bigelow held the First Amendment applicable to speech
that does "more than propose a commercial transaction," the ques-
tion of whether the First Amendment applied to purely commercial
speech was left unanswered until one year later in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.49
In Virginia Pharmacy, consumers of prescription drugs filed
suit claiming Virginia's statute prohibiting price advertising of
prescription drugs "in any manner whatsoever" was unconstitu-
tional. 50 The Board attempted to justify the ban as necessary to
preserve the professional standards of pharmacists.5 1  The
the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id.
at 812-13 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-63 (Michie 1960) (repealed 1975)).
47. Id. at 822.
48. Id. The Court found that in addition to soliciting abortions, the phrase
"Abortions are now legal in New York," also communicated factual material to
those interested in the subject matter of abortion laws. Id. Consequently, the ad-
vertisement was taken out of the realm of "purely commercial" advertising. Id. See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion).
The apparent conflict between Valentine (appended protest against the City
Dock Department did not take the advertisement out of the commercial speech
realm) and Bigelow (appended message communicated factual information to those
interested in abortion laws which took the advertisement out of the purely com-
mercial speech realm) was addressed by the Court. The Court distinguished Val-
entine as a "regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be
distributed." Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819. The Valentine Court noted that "the
message of asserted 'public interest' was appended solely for the purpose of evad-
ing the ordinance and therefore did not constitute an 'exercise of the freedom of
communicating information and disseminating opinion.'" Id. (citing Valentine, 316
U.S. at 54). The conflict between these two cases can, in large part, be attributed
to the differences in the way judges view the facts, see infra note 144.
49. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
50. Id. at 750 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 54-524.35 (Michie 1974) (repealed
1988)). The Virginia statute stated that a pharmacist will be guilty of unprofes-
sional conduct if he "publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in
any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or
credit terms for professional services or for drugs ... which may be dispensed only
by prescription." Id. at 750 n.2.
51. Id. at 751. The Board concluded that if prices were advertised, consumers
would choose the low-cost, low-quality service, and consequently drive the "profes-
sional" pharmacist out of business. Id. at 768. The Board also feared if consumers
were to go from one pharmacist to another, following the discounts, the pharma-
cist-consumer relationship would be destroyed. Id.
1996]
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Supreme Court disagreed, however, and found that the "free flow
of commercial information is indispensable." 52
The eight-to-one decision in Virginia Pharmacy, is generally
regarded as the closest the Court has come to extending full First
Amendment protection to commercial speech.5 3 The Court recog-
nized society's strong interest in receiving commercial information
in order to make intelligent and well-informed decisions. 54 The in-
terest is so strong, the Court noted, that "[aidvertising, however
tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dis-
semination of information as to who is producing and selling what
product, for what reason, and at what price."55 The rule of law
after Virginia Pharmacy was clear: the state could not completely
suppress the dissemination of truthful information relating to a
lawful activity. 56 Several years later, however, the Court back-
tracked and modified the clear holding of Virginia Pharmacy when
it enunciated the controversial Central Hudson test.5 7
In Central Hudson, the Court announced a four-part test to
determine whether a state's restriction on commercial speech was
constitutional. 5  In order to be suppressed, the restriction on com-
mercial speech must: (1) relate to a lawful activity and not be mis-
leading, (2) assert a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly
advance that asserted interest, and (4) be no more extensive than
necessary.59 If the state's restriction satisfies the four prongs,
52. Id. at 765.
53. See Bishop, supra note 19, at 1146; Nutt, supra note 15, at 185.
54. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976). Emphasizing the importance of commercial
speech, the Court noted that "[a]s to the particular consumer's interest in the free
flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
55. Id. at 765.
56. Id. at 773. At the close of the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun, stated
the issue as "whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of con-
cededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that informa-
tion's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients." Id. The Court answered
this "in the negative." Id.
57. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 566. The Central Hudson test is sometimes known as a three-prong
test. In those instances, the first prong is treated as a threshold question which
must be satisfied before addressing the remaining prongs. See generally Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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commercial speech may be restricted. 60 Although the Court may
have established the Central Hudson test to determine the consti-
tutionality of commercial speech restrictions consistently, contro-
versy began immediately. 61
One of the most controversial decisions was Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico.62 Posadas in-
volved a statute enacted by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
which prohibited casino gambling advertisements from being di-
rected toward residents.6 3 The Court granted great deference to
the legislature's assertion that the restriction directly advanced a
substantial government interest, and thus the third prong was
satisfied. 64
60. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
61. See id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the Central Hudson
test is not consistent with prior cases and should not be applied where a state
seeks to suppress commercial information in order to manipulate consumer
decisions).
62. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). See Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v.
Tourism Company: "Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange: 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas
Wondrous Pitiful." 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. See infra note 67.
63. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 320. Puerto Rico Regulation 76a-1(7) states, "[nlo
concessionaire, nor his agent or employee is authorized to advertise the gambling
parlors to the public in Puerto Rico." Id. at 332. This statute was designed to pro-
tect Puerto Rico's residents from the harmful effects incident to gambling. Id. at
341.
64. Id. at 341-42. The determination that Puerto Rico's statute constitution-
ally protected its residents from the harmful effects of gambling was made with
little discussion or analysis. The Court noted the proposed advertisement related
to a lawful activity and was not misleading. Id. at 340-41. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
15, § 71 (1995) (legalizing gambling since 1948). Deference was also granted to the
legislature's belief that the advertising ban was necessary to protect the substan-
tial interest of "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens." Posadas, 478 U.S. at
341. The bulk of the Court's discussion was quoted from the Tourism Company's
brief. The brief stated the legislature's belief as follows:
[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents.. . would produce seri-
ous harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican
citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the in-
crease in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of cor-
ruption, and the infiltration of organized crime.
Id. (alteration in original). Relying on this quote, the Court stated "[w]e have no
difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature's interest ... constitutes a
'substantial' governmental interest." Id. Additionally, the Court held the legisla-
ture was "reasonable" in its belief that a statute restricting casino advertisements
from residents would also decrease the demand for casino gambling among resi-
dents. Id. at 342. The Court reasoned that any restriction on advertising would
advance the state's interest. Id.
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The Court then addressed the fourth prong claim that the re-
striction was more extensive than necessary. The appellants
claimed that the First Amendment only permitted Puerto Rico to
promulgate additional speech to discourage residents from gam-
bling and did not permit a ban on the promotional commercial
speech.65 The Court rejected this claim, and again deferred to the
legislature's judgment to determine whether alternative measures,
such as "counterspeech," would be as effective as the chosen
means.
66
The controversy generated by Posadas illustrates the weak-
nesses of the Central Hudson test.67 Subsequent cases permitted
certified public accountants to solicit clients in person,68 while
prohibiting attorneys from doing the same.6 9 Similarly, a federal
statute prohibiting radio stations from broadcasting lottery adver-
tisements in non-lottery states was upheld, because it advanced
the health, safety and welfare of residents;70 but a federal statute
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id.
67. Writing for the five-to-four majority, then Justice Rehnquist introduced
the controversial "greater includes the lesser" syllogism. Id. 345-46. Justice Rehn-
quist stated Puerto Rico's greater power to ban casino gambling in its entirety
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling. Id. But see 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1512 (1996) (calling the Posadas
syllogism "less defensible"); Posadas, 478 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., joined by Mar-
shall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (stating the Posadas majority did little more
than tip its hat to the Central Hudson standards while deferring to the findings of
Puerto Rico's Legislature). See generally Kurland, supra note 62.
68. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). The Court held Florida's ban on
personal solicitation by certified public accountants threatened the public's inter-
est in receiving complete and accurate information which the First Amendment
was designed to protect. Id. at 768-69. Writing for the eight-to-one majority, Jus-
tice Kennedy stated that despite the state's substantial interest in protecting its
citizens, the Florida Board of Accountancy failed to present any evidence that per-
sonal solicitation by CPA's directly advanced this interest. Id. at 771.
69. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). In Florida Bar,
the Court upheld a thirty day moratorium on lawyers' solicitation of accident vic-
tims or their relatives. Id. The Court held that the ban did "directly advance" the
Florida Bar's goal of protecting the legal profession's reputation from overzealous
attorneys who raced to represent injured plaintiffs. Id. at 2377. Additionally, the
Court also emphasized the lack of "numerous and obvious less-burdensome alter-
natives" to the Florida Bar's temporary ban. Id. at 2380 (quoting City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993)).
70. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). At issue in Edge
Broadcasting was 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988 ed. & Supp. III) which provides in part:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which
a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operat-
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seeking to promote the health, safety and welfare of citizens by
prohibiting alcohol content on labels was found unconstitutional. 71
As these cases demonstrate, the Central Hudson test has been
applied inconsistently and has yielded little certainty to commer-
cial speech litigants. 72 Unless confronted with an identical fact
pattern from a previously decided case, there is no way to accu-
rately predict a case's outcome.
Justice Blackmun has said the Central Hudson test does not
provide sufficient protection for truthful, noncoercive speech relat-
ing to a lawful activity. 73 Justice Stevens has also consistently
criticized the Central Hudson test and the commercial/noncommer-
cial speech distinction.7 4 Recently, both Justices Scalia and
Thomas have expressed discomfort with the Central Hudson test.7 5
On many occasions the Court has attempted to clarify the
four-prong test by refining the individual prongs, but this has only
ing any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any adver-
tisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or
chance . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
Id. at 422 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988 ed. & Supp. In)). The Court held the
statute did "directly advance" the government's goal, and in doing so, refused to
limit the inquiry to Edge Broadcasting alone. Id. at 427-28. Instead, the Court
stated, the question should be directed more broadly toward the "general applica-
tion to others" on a state or national basis. Id. at 427. Additionally, the Court held
the fourth prong was satisfied since the statute furthered the interests of non-
lottery states while not impeding on the rights of lottery states. Id. at 429-30.
71. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995). Finding no credible
evidence supporting the government's argument that the disclosure of alcohol con-
tent would promote "strength wars," the Court dismissed the anecdotal evidence
and educated guesses brought forth by the government. Id. at 1593. Though not
necessary, the Court stressed the unconstitutionality of the statute by briefly ad-
dressing the fourth prong, and finding that several less intrusive restrictions were
available, all of which would have advanced the government's interest. Id. at 1593-
94.
72. See Bishop, supra note 19, at 1143 (stating that commercial speech is "an
area of the law fraught with inconsistency"); Kent, supra note 18, at 3. ("It is clear
that the Supreme Court has not been consistent and . . . much depends on the
makeup of the Court.").
73. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
74. See David 0. Stewart, Change Brewing in Commercial Speech, A.B.A. J.,
July 1996, at 44, 44. See also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579-83 (Stevens, J.
concurring).
75. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996) (Scalia,
J., concurring); id. at 1520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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added to the confusion. The Court has stated an analysis of the
last two prongs requires a reasonable "fit."7 6 Later cases caution
that restrictions must be "narrowly tailored,"77 cannot "burden
substantially more speech than necessary,"78 and that the exist-
ence of numerous and obvious less-burdensome non-speech alter-
natives is a "relevant consideration" in determining whether a
reasonable "fit" exists.79 The use of these vague terms provides lit-
tle guidance to courts, legislatures, or potential litigants, and al-
lows judges the discretion to determine cases based on personal
preferences.8 0
As long as the Court continues to use ambiguous terms, the
legal community will be left guessing each time a commercial
speech case is heard.8 1 The Court must resist this temptation and
determine categorical rules for commercial speech. In 44 Li-
quormart, the Court does not make the leap to promulgate any
bright line rules. The Court does, however, break from tradition.
Instead of creating additional terms in an attempt to define the
procrustean Central Hudson test, the Justices lay the groundwork
to abandon the test.
II. 44 LIQUORmART INC. V. RHODE ISLAND
A. Facts
In late 1991, 44 Liquormart, Inc., a retail store located in
Johnston, Rhode Island, placed an advertisement in a Rhode Is-
land daily newspaper.8 2 The advertisement included pictures of
various brand name liquors, but nowhere did the price of alcohol
appear. In fact, the advertisement noted "State law prohibits ad-
vertising liquor prices." 3 However, next to some of the pictures of
76. Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
77. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478
(1989).
78. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993).
79. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13
(1993).
80. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1520 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. See accompanying page for the relevant portion of the advertisement. The
other half of the advertisement promoted peanuts, potato chips and Schweppes
mixers for sale at specific prices. This advertisement was reprinted from The Prov-
idence Journal Bulletin, November 21, 1991, at Metro West II page 5.
83. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503.
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brand name liquors the highlighted word "WOW" appeared.8 4 As a
result of this advertisement, the Rhode Island Liquor Control Ad-
ministration held a hearing and determined Rhode Island's statute
prohibiting the price advertisement of alcohol had been violated.85
After paying the four hundred dollar fine, 44 Liquormart
joined with People's Super Liquor Stores, Inc.,8 6 and appealed to
the Federal District Court of Rhode Island claiming a violation of
their First Amendment rights.8 7 The parties stipulated that the
advertisement constituted commercial speech.18 Pursuant to Cen-
tral Hudson, the district court applied the four-prong test to deter-
mine whether Rhode Island's ban on the advertising of alcohol
prices was constitutional. The parties agreed the advertisement in
question was truthful, nonmisleading, and related to a lawful ac-
tivity. 44 Liquormart also agreed that "Rhode Island has a sub-
stantial interest in fostering temperance and . . . 'protect[ing] its
citizens from the evils incident to alcohol.'"8 9 Therefore, the first
two prongs of the Central Hudson test were satisfied and only the
last two prongs of the test were in dispute.90
84. Id.
85. Id. Rhode Island General Law § 3-8-7 provides:
[N]o holder of a [liquor] license... shall cause or permit the advertising in
any manner whatsoever of the price of any malt beverage, cordials, wine or
distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however, that the
provisions of this section shall not apply to price signs or tags attached to
or placed on merchandise for sale within the licensed premises ....
R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-8-7 (1987) (emphasis added).
86. 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.R.I. 1993). 44
Liquormart was a co-plaintiff with People's Super Liquor Stores, Inc., a Massachu-
setts corporation which operated licensed retail stores in Massachusetts. Id. Peo-
ple's, who had previously attempted to advertise the price of alcohol in Rhode
Island newspapers, joined 44 Liquormart in challenging the constitutionality of
the advertising price ban. Id. Specifically, People's challenged Rhode Island Gen-
eral Law § 3-8-8.1. See infra note 101.
87. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503. 44 Liquormart's appeal to the district
court was filed against Kate F. Racine, Administrator for the Rhode Island Liquor
Control Administration. Prior to reaching the Court of Appeals, the State of Rhode
Island was substituted as the defendant. Id.
88. 44 Liquor Mart, 829 F. Supp. at 551.
89. Id. at 551 (quoting S & S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 732
(R.I. 1985)).
90. Rhode Island contended that the legislature's ban on advertising the price
of alcohol need only be "reasonably related to," and not "directly advance" its goal
of promoting temperance. Id. As support, the State claimed that under the
Twenty-first Amendment the Rhode Island statute was entitled to an "added pre-
sumption" of validity, and the burden of proof shifted to the plaintiffs to show the
statute "unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
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In an extensive and well-reasoned opinion, the district court
held the price ban violated the third prong of the Central Hudson
test.91 The court found, as a matter of fact, "that Rhode Island's
off-premises liquor price advertising ban has no significant impact
on levels of alcohol consumption in Rhode Island."92 In addition,
the district court also found that the statute violated the fourth
prong since the prohibition was more extensive than necessary to
serve the State's interest.93
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, stating that the district
court erred when it decided the State's evidence was unpersua-
sive. 94 Instead, the Court of Appeals found "inherent merit" in the
State's assertion that competitive advertising will lead to lower
prices, and consequently, more sales.95 In May, 1995, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Rhode Island may,
consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit truthful, nonmis-
leading price advertising concerning alcohol. 96
B. The Decision
Although the Court unanimously ruled the price ban was un-
constitutional, there was no majority consensus regarding the ra-
tionale.97 Four separate opinions highlight the split among the
Justices. The importance of 44 Liquormart lies not in its holding,
91. Id. at 554.
92. Id. at 549. In arriving at this decision, the court found the state's expert
testimony unpersuasive. Id. at 548. Additionally, the court noted that with the
price ban in effect Rhode Island ranked in the top 30% in per capita consumption.
Id. at 546. The court also referred to a 1985 Federal Trade study which found "no
evidence to believe alcohol advertising significantly affects alcohol abuse." Id.
93. Specifically, the district court observed that the state's goal could be
achieved through the imposition of a higher sales tax or minimum consumer
prices. Id. at 554.
94. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1994). The ap-
peals court stated "[t]he district court held that it was an issue for it [the district
court] to decide, unfettered, between competing witnesses, and since, on its weigh-
ing the evidence, the [district] court was not persuaded that the State was correct,
it failed." Id. The First Circuit held the burden in establishing whether the evi-
dence directly advanced the state's restriction was not as strict as "correctness,"
but should have only been whether the restriction was reasonable. Id. The court
also found that the Twenty-first Amendment added a presumption of constitution-
ality to the statute. Id. at 8.
95. Id. at 7.
96. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 115 S. Ct. 1821 (1995) (granting
certiorari).
97. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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but in the perspective the various opinions reveal about the cur-
rent state of the commercial speech doctrine. Two opinions openly
express dissatisfaction with the Central Hudson test,9s while a
third strongly implies a lack of commitment.9 9 In light of these
opinions, the continued viability of the Central Hudson test is in
doubt.
1. The Principal Opinion: Justice Stevens'00
Although Justice Stevens did not explicitly express his dissat-
isfaction with the Central Hudson test, the practical effect of his
principal opinion is to signal a discontinuance of the existing doc-
trine. Justice Stevens began the opinion by describing the facts
and background surrounding the 44 Liquormart case. 1° 1 The opin-
ion stressed the important role advertising has played in our na-
98. The two opinions were written by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 1515
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. Justice Stevens's opinion. Id. at 1508-10 (Stevens, J., plurality).
100. Justice Stevens's principal opinion was divided into eight sections; only
sections I, II, VII and VIII received a majority. The Justices in favor of each
section are as follows:
I. Rhode Island Precedent: Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas and Ginsburg.
II. Facts and Background: Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas and Ginsburg.
III. Historical Background: Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and
Ginsburg.
IV. Level of Protection: Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg.
V. Commercial Speech Analysis: Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and
Ginsburg.
VI. Rhode Island's Arguments: Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas and
Ginsburg.
VII. The Twenty-first Amendment: Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas and Ginsburg.
VIII. The Holding: Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter
and Ginsburg.
101. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1501. Justice Stevens noted the two statutes
prohibiting the price advertisement of alcohol were enacted into law by the Rhode
Island Legislature in 1956. Id. The opinion continued by noting the constitutional-
ity of both statutes had previously been reviewed by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. Id. at 1502.
InS & S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 731 (R.I. 1985), the Rhode
Island Supreme Court upheld Rhode Island General Law § 3-8-7 in which a liquor
retailer in Westerly, Rhode Island, attempted to advertise the price of alcohol in a
Connecticut newspaper. Finding the statute did "directly advance" the legisla-
ture's goal of promoting temperance, and the price prohibition was no "more exten-
sive than necessary," the court found the statute to be constitutional. Id. at 734-35.
See generally id. at 738-39 (Murray, J., dissenting).
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tion's history, and traced the constitutional protection afforded to
commercial speech since Bigelow v. Virginia.10 2 Significantly, Jus-
tice Stevens ignored the last sixteen years of doctrinal confusion in
this area, and ended the historical background portion of his opin-
ion in 1980 with the establishment of the Central Hudson test. 03
Even more dramatic than the absence of historical precedent over
the past sixteen years is Justice Stevens's commercial speech
analysis.
Prior to reviewing the constitutionality of the price ban stat-
ute, the principal opinion rejected Rhode Island's assertion that all
commercial speech regulations should be subject to intermediate
review. 10 4 Instead, Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg es-
tablished two categories for reviewing commercial speech restric-
tions. Regulations which protect consumers from misleading,
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices (or which require addi-
tional information to be disclosed for the consumer's benefit)
should be reviewed under less than strict review.105 On the other
hand, prohibitions against truthful and nonmisleading commercial
On the same day that S & S Liquor Mart was decided, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court also decided Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association v. Evening
Call Pub. Company, 497 A.2d 331, 333 (R.I. 1985), where the plaintiff, Liquor
Stores Association, sought to enjoin the defendants from seeking and publishing
advertisements for the price of alcohol. This case centered around Rhode Island
General Law § 3-8-8.1 which states:
[n]o newspaper, periodical, radio or television broadcaster or broadcasting
company or any other person, firm or corporation with a principal place of
business in the state of Rhode Island which is engaged in the business of
advertising or selling advertising time or space shall accept, publish, or
broadcast any advertisement in this state of the price or make reference to
the price of any alcoholic beverages.
Id. at 332 n.1 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-8-8.1 (1987)).
The court followed its reasoning in S & S Liquor Mart and found this statute
also passed the constitutional scrutiny of the Central Hudson test. Id. at 337. Spe-
cifically, the court stated it was not "unreasonable for the State of Rhode Island to
believe that price advertising will result in increased sales of alcoholic beverages
generally." Id. at 336. See generally id. at 338-42 (Weisberger, J., dissenting); id. at
342-43 (Murray, J., dissenting).
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court found both statutes to be constitu-
tional, the court ironically states "[it may be that some day, in some litigated case,
evidence will be adduced that will support the proposition that these advertising
restrictions do not further temperance objectives." S & S Liquor Mart, 497 A.2d at
734.
102. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1504-07 (Stevens, J., plurality).
103. Id. at 1504-07.
104. Id. at 1507.
105. Id. See supra note 3.
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speech should be subject to the more "rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands." 10 6 However, applying this
strict review to the "no more extensive than necessary" (fourth)
prong of the Central Hudson test will result in a "least restrictive
means" analysis, something the Court has been unwilling to accept
in previous commercial speech cases.' 07 At least three members of
the Court, however, now seem willing to apply the First Amend-
ment's "least restrictive means" test to commercial speech.' 08
Once strict review is applied to the fourth prong, it becomes
apparent the Central Hudson test is doomed. According to Justice
Stevens, the existence of any non-speech alternative indicates that
the restriction is more extensive than necessary. 10 9 Justice Ste-
vens's opinion noted an unbroken line of precedent striking down
regulations of truthful, nonmisleading advertising when "non-
speech alternatives were available.""u 0 Thus, since some non-
speech alternatives will almost always exist, the fourth prong will
never be satisfied."'
106. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507.
107. According to strict scrutiny's "least restrictive means" test, the govern-
ment may regulate speech only "to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." Melville B. Nimmer,
Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 3.02[4][A] n.239 (1994) (quoting Sable Communi-
cations of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1988)
(emphasis added)).
During Oral Argument in 44 Liquormart, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded
to Petitioner 44 Liquormart by stating "we don't apply a least-restrictive means
test in that fourth prong of Central Hudson." United States Supreme Court Oral
Argument Transcript, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 1995 WL 641127, at *4
(No. 94-1140) Nov. 1, 1994. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 476 (1989) (rejecting a "least restrictive means" test).
108. The three members are: Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg. 44 Li-
quormart, 116 S. Ct. 1507-08 (Stevens, J., plurality). See id. at 1510. ("It is per-
fectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any
restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal of promoting
temperance.") (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 1510. Justice Stevens's statement that the existence of "alternative
forms of regulation[s] that would not involve any restriction on speech" marks a
dramatic change in the fourth prong analysis. Id. (emphasis added). In Discovery
Network, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated only that the existence of
"numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives . . . is certainly a relevant
consideration" in the fourth prong analysis. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993).
110. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511 (Stevens, J., plurality) (citing Posadas,
478 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing cases)).
111. This view is also espoused by Justice Thomas. See infra Part II.B.2.
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The practical effect of Justice Stevens's application of strict re-
view is the abandonment of the Central Hudson test. Moreover,
while the use of strict review clearly allows this inference to be
drawn, additional support for this conclusion can also be surmised
from Justice Stevens's commercial speech analysis.
Upon initial inspection, it appears as though the Central Hud-
son test permeates Justice Stevens's analysis. After a careful read-
ing, however, a significant omission becomes apparent. For the
first time since the Supreme Court enunciated the Central Hudson
test, the Court's commercial speech analysis is noticeably absent of
any mention of the Central Hudson test and its four prongs. 112
The likelihood that the principal opinion merely overlooked using
the words that have been at the heart of every commercial speech
case since 1980 is extremely remote. The combination of the ap-
parently purposeful omission of any reference to the "prongs," or
the "four-prong test," along with Justice Stevens ending the histor-
ical background material at Central Hudson, clearly signals his
dissatisfaction with the evolution of the commercial speech
doctrine.
2. The Concurring Opinions: Justices O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas
In addition to Justice Stevens's principal opinion, the three
concurring opinions which comprise the 44 Liquormart decision
also express dissatisfaction with the current commercial speech
doctrine. Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, decided this case on the
narrowest grounds. Using Central Hudson, Justice O'Connor
found Rhode Island's price advertising ban unconstitutional. 1 13
Stating that the Rhode Island statute failed "even the less strin-
gent standard set out in Central Hudson," Justice O'Connor deter-
mined it was unnecessary to consider an alternative to the present
commercial speech analysis used in this case. 1 14
Similarly, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion also determined
this case using the existing Central Hudson framework." 5 Unlike
112. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508-10 (Stevens, J., plurality).
113. Id. at 1520-22 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Souter & Breyer,
JJ., concurring).
114. Id. at 1522.
115. Id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor, however, Justice Scalia made it clear that he is
not satisfied with the current Central Hudson analysis. Justice
Scalia began his opinion by stating the Central Hudson test has
"nothing more than policy intuition to support it."116 Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia resolved the case using Central Hudson since the
Court had not been briefed with an alternative."17 Justice Scalia
warned, however, he was "not disposed to develop new law, or rein-
force old."" 8 With this hint, Justice Scalia is apparently inviting
future parties to submit briefs that propose an alternative com-
mercial speech analysis.
The most far-reaching opinion in 44 Liquormart, however, was
written by Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas, like Justice Scalia,
found the Central Hudson test to be nothing more than a case-by-
case balancing test, unaccompanied by any categorical rules and
often governed by the pretenses of individual judges.119 As a re-
sult, Justice Thomas found the Rhode Island statute unconstitu-
tional without applying the Central Hudson test.120 Justice
Thomas stated that regulating commercial speech in order to ma-
nipulate choices of legal products is not legitimate, and cannot be
justified any more than a regulation on "noncommercial" speech.' 2 1
Thus, such regulations are "per se illegitimate."122
Justice Thomas conceded that Justices Stevens's and
O'Connor's analysis of the fourth prong would eventually reach the
same result. 123 The Stevens and O'Connor opinions argue a com-
mercial speech restriction that operates to withhold truthful, non-
misleading information from consumers will not survive scrutiny
of the fourth prong if any non-speech alternative exists. Given the
numerous alternatives available, such as rationing, price controls,
taxing, "counterspeech" designed to educate consumers on the dan-
gers of a product, and even prohibiting a product from being sold, it
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 1518.
121. Id. at 1516.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1519.
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is almost certain that some non-speech alternative will always
exist.1 24
Realizing the fourth prong can never be satisfied, Justice
Thomas's analysis went one step further.125 Instead of applying
the Central Hudson test to reach the "inevitable result," Justice
Thomas advocated abandoning the Central Hudson test in favor of
returning to the rule established in Virginia Pharmacy.126 Under
that rule "all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by
keeping them ignorant are impermissible." 12 7
The four opinions in 44 Liquormart accentuate the Court's di-
vision on the subject of commercial speech. On one end of the spec-
trum is Justice O'Connor, who found it unnecessary to consider a
more protective First Amendment analysis since the facts of 44 Li-
quormart do not even survive the less stringent Central Hudson
test. Although Justice O'Connor used the intermediate protection
framework established in Central Hudson, her opinion stops short
of endorsing the four-prong test. At the other end of the spectrum
is Justice Thomas, who argued that the Central Hudson test
should be abandoned. 128
The implication is clear: the Central Hudson test does not pro-
vide a sufficient amount of protection. Whether commercial speech
will be allotted full First Amendment protection is unknown. It is
apparent, however, that the Court is providing commercial speech
with more constitutional protection than it has received in the
past. 129
III. THE COMMERCIALJNONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH DIsTINcTION
The Court's dissatisfaction with Central Hudson has been
building for years, and 44 Liquormart finally signals the end of
124. Id. at 1510 (Stevens, J., plurality), id. at 1519 (Thomas, J., concurring), id.
at 1522 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Souter & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).
125. Id. at 1519-20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 1520.
127. Id. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
128. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
129. See Burt Neuborne, Pushing Free Speech Too Far, N.Y. Times, July 15,
1996, at A13 ("The current Supreme Court is the fiercest defender of the First
Amendment in the Court's history.").
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this test. 130 However, before the Court enunciates a new doctrine,
it must first examine the foundation of commercial speech. 131
A. Attempting to Define Commercial Speech
A distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
was first recognized in Valentine v. Chrestensen.132 While the
Supreme Court has not recently focused its attention on this dis-
tinction, one must question whether it should.' 33 The Court has
defined commercial speech as speech which does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction."134 This definition seems sim-
ple enough to understand and categorize, but once an advertise-
ment is broken down and micro-analyzed, the Court's definition
cannot be sustained.
Virginia Pharmacy demonstrates the simplest scenario: pure
commercial speech. In that case, the Court correctly categorized "I
will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price" as commercial
speech.' 35 The speech considered by the Court contained nothing
130. In Central Hudson, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the four-prong test
the majority believed had developed from past commercial speech cases. Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun stated the test was "not consistent with our prior cases and does not
provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial
speech." Id. Recently, Justice Stevens remarked the Central Hudson Court's ap-
proach to the test was "misguided." Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585,
1595 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Central Hudson, 442 U.S. at 579-83 (Ste-
vens, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring). Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct.
2038, 2048 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (In the area of the First Amendment
"fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more subjective bal-
ancing tests."); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he use of ... tradi-
tional legal categories is preferable to the sort of ad hoc balancing [tests]."). See
also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1187 (1989) ("For my sins, I will probably write some... opinions that use [balanc-
ing tests], [aIll I urge is that th[e]se modes of analysis be avoided where possible.").
131. Since Central Hudson, the Court has never really examined the underpin-
nings of the commercial speech doctrine. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 634.
132. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Recall the commercial/noncommercial speech distinc-
tion enunciated in Valentine was founded without citing any authority. See supra
notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
133. For additional discussion on the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech, see generally Kozinski, supra note 6, at 634-48.
134. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973).
135. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
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more than a pharmacist explicitly proposing to sell "X prescription"
for "Y price." Hence, in this instance, defining commercial speech
as that which does "no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion" fits into the Virginia Pharmacy model. The problem, how-
ever, is that most speech does not fit into this category as neatly.
Few would argue that an advertisement stating "To be eligible
for the fifty million dollar jackpot, buy a one dollar ticket" is com-
mercial speech. This advertisement fits into the Virginia Phar-
macy model where a transaction is explicitly proposed, i.e.,
providing a specific product or service in exchange for a stated
price. But what if the advertisement only mentions the product or
service and omits any reference to the price? Take for example an
advertisement heard weekly in most states: "Tonight's jackpot is
fifty million dollars." The purpose of the advertisement is clearly
to entice consumers into buying a one dollar ticket in hopes of hit-
ting the jackpot, but the advertisement does not explicitly propose
a commercial transaction. Certainly the advertisement does not
expressly propose that consumers spend "Y price" to have a chance
at the jackpot. Yet, one would be hard-pressed to believe states
advertise their weekly jackpot solely as a public service to the com-
munity and not with the intent of implicitly proposing a commer-
cial transaction. Additional examples further illustrate the
difficulty of classifying speech as commercial or noncommercial.
A ten second advertisement by Hallmark that "Mother's Day
is Sunday," followed by Hallmark's trademark, would implicitly
propose buying a card for mother at "Y price," and thus fall into the
same category as the second lottery advertisement. And yet, a
news report alerting millions of Americans about the upcoming
holiday, and suggesting specific gifts for a stated price, is not con-
sidered commercial speech. Looking strictly at the definition of
commercial speech, the news report would seem to fit into the Vir-
ginia Pharmacy model better than Hallmark's advertisement. The
news report is explicitly informing consumers about "X product" on
sale for 'Y price," while the Hallmark advertisement is only stating
that "Sunday is Mother's Day." According to the Supreme Court,
the news report is entitled to more constitutional protection than
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the Hallmark advertisement, 13 6 but the result of each is the same,
viz., millions of dollars spent on Hallmark products.
While the above example shows the importance of the
speaker's intent, further illustrations demonstrate that the intent
of the listener is of equal importance. 137 For example, upon hear-
ing "the Yankees will host the Boston Red Sox at the Stadium to-
night," a life-long fan of the New York Yankees may be enticed to
purchase tickets. Certainly, this speech does not explicitly propose
a commercial transaction. But does it fit into the same category as
the lottery and Hallmark advertisements where a commercial
transaction is implicit? The life-long Yankee fan could see this an-
nouncement as implying "X product" for "Y price," while others
may interpret the statement as only an announcement of an up-
coming sports event. The examples go on ad infinitum. 38
As the above examples demonstrate, a strict reading of an ad-
vertisement provides that no speech is commercial, while a liberal
reading indicates that all speech is commercial. Millions of hus-
bands and children would agree a strict interpretation of "Sunday
is Mother's Day" is that it disseminates only useful information
averting certain future strife. But common sense and economic
markets make it hard to believe Hallmark was not proposing a
commercial transaction. Upon reflection, it is apparent that cate-
gorizing speech as commercial or noncommercial is not as easy as
the Supreme Court may have first suggested.
A good example of liberal interpretation is Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia.3 9 In order to find the advertisement constitutionally pro-
tected, the Court stretched to interpret the advertisement as
136. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), with Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
137. While focusing on the intent of the listener or the speaker may be the only
way to accurately categorize speech as commercial or noncommercial, the Supreme
Court has expressly stated that intent may not be considered. See Kozinski, supra
note 6, at 639-40 (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-65).
138. For example, one would not argue that the weather portion of a newscast
is noncommercial, and thus entitled to full First Amendment protection. But what
if the weather report were sponsored by a company who manufactures raingear?
What if instead of sponsoring a weather report, the company decided to run a
thirty second infomercial on days when rain was likely to fall? Again, this would
seem to implicitly propose a commercial transaction.
139. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Recall that this case involved an advertisement that
stated, "Abortions are now legal in New York." Id. at 812.
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proposing more than just a commercial transaction. 140 The Court
reasoned that, in addition to proposing abortions, the advertise-
ment also served to inform those interested in abortion laws that
abortions are now legal in New York. 14 ' This case illustrates that
an expressly commercial transaction can also be found to contain
newsworthy information. 142
Not only is it difficult to define commercial speech, but as Bige-
low demonstrates, a few words appended to a purely commercial
message can yield full First Amendment protection. For instance,
take Mr. Chrestensen's attempt in Valentine.143 Although unsuc-
cessful, Chrestensen's effort illustrates how one might add news-
worthy information to an otherwise purely commercial
advertisement in order to claim full First Amendment protec-
tion.' 44 For example, "Cigarettes cost $3.00, but the Surgeon Gen-
eral warns that smoking may be harmful to your health," or "A six
pack of beer costs $5.00, but remember to drink responsibly." In-
stantly, these purely commercial messages, which were to receive
only intermediate protection under the Central Hudson test, now
"do more than propose a commercial transaction" and are appar-
ently entitled to full First Amendment protection.
The above examples demonstrate the difficulty in defining
commercial speech. 45 Even if definable, speech can easily be mod-
140. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
141. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
142. Newsworthy information can be found in almost any commercial adver-
tisement. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 653. The opposite is also true. Certain
newsworthy information can expressly or implicitly propose a commercial transac-
tion, such as the financial pages of the stock market, the weather report, see supra
note 138, or even the sports pages, see supra p. 82.
143. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
144. The "public interest" statement may not be appended to the commercial
message solely to avoid the advertisement from being classified as commercial
speech. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819 ("The [Valentine] Court found that the
message of asserted 'public interest' was appended solely for the purpose of evad-
ing the ordinance and therefore did not constitute an 'exercise of the freedom of
communicating information and disseminating opinion.'" (citing Valentine, 316
U.S. at 54)). This holding, however, places the burden on judges to determine
when speech is "appended solely for the purpose of evading the ordinance." Id.
Judges will be forced to determine whether a beer company really wants their cus-
tomers to drink responsibly, or whether this message was added only to receive
full First Amendment protection. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 653 (stating a com-
mercial aspect can be found in almost any First Amendment case).
145. In Central Hudson, a landmark commercial speech case, the Court could
not even agree on whether the speech in question was commercial. See Central
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ified in order to gain a greater amount of constitutional protection
by appending public service messages. A review of the public pol-
icy arguments used to justify less than full protection to commer-
cial speech will further demonstrate the weak foundation upon
which the commercial speech doctrine is built.
B. Attempting to Comprehend the "Commonsense Differences"
The Supreme Court first enunciated two "commonsense differ-
ences" between commercial and noncommercial speech in Virginia
Pharmacy.14 6 These two "commonsense differences" consist of the
Court's belief that (1) commercial speech is more easily verifiable
by its speaker than other types of speech, and (2) commercial
speech is more durable and therefore less likely to be chilled by
regulations. 147 Although the Court states commercial speech
should be given less protection because of these two differences, it
never explains why the distinctions are important.'4 8 After exami-
nation, the Court's rationale for the two distinctions cannot be
justified.
First, commercial speech is not necessarily more verifiable
than noncommercial speech.1 49 There are many instances where
commercial claims are inherently more difficult to verify. Take, for
example, a commercial stating that three out of four dentists ap-
prove of a particular product. The only way to verify this state-
ment empirically is to survey all practicing dentists. In contrast,
there are many noncommercial claims which can be easily verified.
For instance, a political candidate might truthfully remind the
public that his opponent voted for or against a certain bill while in
Congress. The veracity of this statement is easily verifiable. Yet,
no one argues the candidate's statement is entitled to less than full
constitutional protection.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 583 (1980)
(Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring) (believing Central Hudson is not a
commercial speech case).
146. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
147. Id.
148. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 634. ("[Tlhe two differences are never ques-
tioned; at no time has any member of the Court suggested that [the two reasons]
do not justify a lower level of protection for commercial speech.").
149. See id. at 636.
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The verifiability of the claim should not determine the applica-
ble level of protection. Even if the Court were correct in stating
that commercial claims are more easily verifiable, no reason exists
to justify less protection for speech which can be verified. Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court has stated commercial advertisements are
easier to verify and should therefore receive less protection.150
The second reason the Court gives to justify less protection for
commercial speech is that the speaker has a self-interest in dis-
seminating the information, and therefore, the speech is more du-
rable and less likely to be chilled. 151 But once again the Supreme
Court fails to explain why this is important. 152 Even assuming
this rationale is important, the Court's distinction is so broad it
would seem to include almost all speech.' 53
The New York Times, for instance, has an economic interest in
selling subscriptions to its newspaper, but no one advocates their
speech is more durable and not worthy of full constitutional protec-
tion. Authors spend years writing books which, if sold, will repre-
sent a significant portion of their incomes, and yet, this speech
receives full First Amendment protection. Under the Supreme
Court's reasoning, even politicians could be said to have a self-in-
terest in their speeches, and therefore receive less protection.' 54
Yet, no one supports the view that political speech represents a
durable type of speech, and is therefore entitled to less than full
protection.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court cites several cases involving
books, motion pictures, and religious literature supporting its con-
clusion that speech is protected even though it is "sold for
profit." -5 5 The Court, however, does not explain the differences be-
tween speech appearing in books for sale and speech advertising
150. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 148; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1212, 1223 (1983) ("The Court has not explained why commercial speech de-
serves a subordinate place in a hierarchy of protected speech ...
153. See Kozinski, supra note 6, at 653 n.53.
154. A politician who decides not to give speeches will be forced to change ca-
reers after Election Day.
155. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)
(motion pictures); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (religious
literature).
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books for sale. Although the two seem to be "inextricably linked,"
the Court affords the latter less protection.156
Just as the Court's definition of commercial speech does not
survive the most basic examples, neither do the two reasons sup-
porting the "commonsense differences." Although the two differ-
ences may have originally justified less protection when
promulgated in Virginia Pharmacy, later cases question the valid-
ity of the distinctions. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority
opinion in Virginia Pharmacy, has subsequently stated that the
Court "ha[s] not suggested that the 'commonsense differences' be-
tween commercial speech and other speech justify relaxed scrutiny
of restraints that suppress truthful, nondeceptive, noncoercive
commercial speech."15 7 Other opinions have echoed Justice Black-
mun's sentiments. 58
In fact, the First Amendment clearly supports the conclusion
that commercial speech which is truthful, nonmisleading and re-
lated to a lawful activity should receive full First Amendment pro-
tection. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes theorized that "the First
Amendment prohibits government suppression of ideas because
the truth of any idea can only be determined in the 'marketplace' of
competing ideas."159 But by granting commercial speech less pro-
tection, the Court is implicitly stating that consumers have less of
a right to commercial information. 160
The result of the Court's commercial speech doctrine has been
to place speech which relates to a commercial activity on a differ-
ent plateau than speech which communicates other ideas.' 61 This
156. See supra notes 3, 5.
157. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 578 (1980) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun continued his attack on the "commonsense differences" by stating that
"No differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify
suppression of commercial speech." Id.
158. See also Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 351
(1986) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("[N]o differ-
ences between commercial and other kinds of speech justify protecting commercial
speech less extensively . . ").
159. Nowak, supra note 2, at 992 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that regulation restricting "commercial" speech "strikes at the
heart of the First Amendment"). Id.
161. Commercial speech has been placed in the same category as pornography,
defamation and offensive speech. Eberle, supra note 3, at 437.
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has been done despite the fact that commercial information affects
consumer decisions every day of every year.162
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy recognized society's "strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information"163 when it
stated:
Advertising, however, tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to
who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private eco-
nomic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable. 164
Despite the "indispensable" role commercial speech has on an
individual's daily decision, and the questionable foundation upon
which the doctrine is built, the Court has steadfastly held to its
decision in Valentine: commercial speech is not entitled to full
First Amendment protection. 16 5 An analysis of the cases decided
since Central Hudson, however, leads to the conclusion that even
though the Court says commercial speech is to be afforded less pro-
tection, the Court has almost always found restrictions on truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech to be unconstitutional.
Since 1980, the Court has decided at least seventeen commer-
cial speech cases. 166 Of these cases, the Court has found that the
restrictions in fourteen of these cases violated the First Amend-
ment. 167 Furthermore, the three cases where a restriction was
found not to violate the freedom of speech rest on specious grounds.
162. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (stating that commercial speech "may be as keen,
if not keener by far, than [one's] interest in the day's most urgent political debate").
163. Id. at 764.
164. Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
165. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
166. See supra note 14.
167. The three cases where restrictions on commercial speech did not violate
the First Amendment are Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995),
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), and Posadas de P.R. Assoc.
v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). Additionally, the Court in Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego found a San Diego ordinance restricting the use
of commercial advertisements on billboards satisfied the requirements of the Cen-
tral Hudson test, but declared the ordinance to be unconstitutional since it in-
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Florida Bar stands on special ground because of the unique
attention the Court has paid to attorney advertising. 168 In addi-
tion, the five-to-four decision could be considered an anomaly as
Florida Bar is only the second attorney advertising case to uphold
significant restrictions on an attorney's right to advertise. 16 9 The
other two cases where restrictions on commercial speech were up-
held are in an even more precarious position.
Posadas, decided in 1986, was all but explicitly overruled by
44 Liquormart. Justice Stevens stated that "Posadas erroneously
performed the First Amendment analysis." 70 In addition, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion criticized Posadas as accepting,
"without further inquiry," Puerto Rico's assertions that the gam-
bling regulation furthered the commonwealth's interest and was
no more extensive than necessary. 171 44 Liquormart also severely
limited the holding in Edge Broadcasting by explaining the federal
statute was upheld because it "regulate[d] advertising about an ac-
tivity that had been deemed illegal in th[at] jurisdiction ....'72
The Court's decision in 44 Liquormart to re-examine and mod-
ify the holding of both Posadas and Edge Broadcasting clears the
truded too far into the arena of protected speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521 (1981) (White, J., plurality). The view that the ordinance
constitutionally restricted commercial speech, however, did not receive a majority
of the Court as only Justices White, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell supported this
view. Id. at 493. Interpretations of this decision have characterized the plurality
decision in Metromedia as "dicta." Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
946 F.2d 464, 470 n.9 (6th Cir. 1991).
168. The Court has heard no less than five lawyer advertising cases since 1980:
Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. 2371; Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466
(1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626 (1985); and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). For an overview of the
protection the Court has allotted to lawyer advertising see Jodi Vanderwater,
Note, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., Restricting Attorney Advertising to Preserve
the Image of the Legal Profession, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 765, 773-80 (1996). See also
Kozinski, supra note 6, at 630; Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.1-7.5
(1983).
169. See The Supreme Court, 1994 Term - Leading Cases - Commercial Speech -
Attorney Advertising, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 190, 195 (1995). The first case to uphold
restrictions on attorney advertising was Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978) (holding an attorney may not personally solicit clients).
170. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1511 (1996) (Stevens,
J., plurality).
171. Id. at 1522 (O'Connor J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Souter & Breyer,
JJ., concurring).
172. Id. at 1511 (Stevens, J., plurality). See supra note 70.
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way for the Court to give truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech relating to a lawful activity full First Amendment protec-
tion. The Court can now look to its precedent since Central Hud-
son, with the possible exception of Florida Bar, and unequivocally
state that restrictions which suppress truthful, nonmisleading
commercial information relating to a lawful activity have been
held unconstitutional.
Prior to 44 Liquormart, the Court had maintained that com-
mercial speech receives only "a limited measure of protection."173
But, as the majority of cases make clear, restrictions on truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech are rarely upheld. Now, after
44 Liquormart, the few cases upholding restrictions on commercial
speech as constitutional, have been modified. Having determined
that nearly all commercial speech restrictions since Central Hud-
son are unconstitutional, the time has come for the Court to re-
examine the definition of commercial speech and the two "common-
sense differences." After reviewing the two commercial speech
components, the Court will realize their rationale is no longer
valid. The only remaining question is what will be the parameters
of the new commercial speech doctrine.
CONCLUSION
No rational reason exists to distinguish truthful and nonmis-
leading commercial speech from other fully protected speech. The
Court has repeatedly tried to define commercial speech, but as the
cases demonstrate, the definition has been either too broad or too
narrow. The Court has stated "commonsense differences" exist
that necessitate the differing levels of constitutional protection af-
forded to commercial and noncommercial speech. But, while the
differences may be common, they do not make sense. The Court
has even gone so far as to suggest that if commercial speech were
given more protection, this would somehow take away from First
Amendment protection allotted to noncommercial speech.1 74 The
First Amendment, however, does not maintain a constant amount
of protection which must be shared by all forms of speech. 175 Addi-
173. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1995).
174. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481
(1989) (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456).
175. See also Kozinski, supra note 6, at 648.
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tionally, one need look no further than Posadas to see that com-
mercial speech cases have not received proper protection.1 76
With 44 Liquormart at bar, the Court announced the last call
for the Central Hudson test. Rather than trying to support an al-
ready saturated doctrine, the Court flicks the lights, and signals
the end of Central Hudson's dominance over cases involving truth-
ful, nonmisleading commercial speech related to a lawful
activity.1 77
Michael W. Field
176. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1511 (1996) (Ste-
vens, J., plurality) ("W]e are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously performed
the First Amendment analysis.").
177. See id. at 1520 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Rather than continuing to apply
a test [Central Hudson] that makes no sense... I would return to the reasoning
and holding of Virginia Pharmacy Bd."); Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of
P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 351 (1986) (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) ("I believe that where the government seeks to suppress the dissemina-
tion of nonmisleading commercial speech relating to legal activities ... such regu-
lation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny."); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
joined by Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Court's four-part test is [not] the proper
one to be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in
order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or has not
regulated or outlawed directly."). See also Eberle, supra note 3, at 476 (arguing
that regardless of the lawfulness of the activity, truthful, nondeceptive, and nonco-
ercive commercial speech may not be restricted, except pursuant to strict scrutiny).
